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A Historical/Political Analysis
By M am oo n  A m in Z a k i
W hen the Gulf war between Iran and Iraq began in 1980, many people thought that Iraq would 
achieve a swift and decisive victory because 
of the chaotic situation of the Iranian 
government.1 But Iran stood fast and the 
war goes on. The Gulf war, like all other 
wars, is bound to come to an end sooner or 
later because both belligerents are pro­
fusely hemorrhaging economically, mili­
tarily, and most of all, in human casualties. 
And the outcome of this war may lead to a 
social change of historical magnitude not 
only in the Middle East, but also beyond the 
region.
Imam Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime 
needs a decisive victory in order to justify 
the enormous casualties of young “mar­
tyrs” (estimated to be more than half a 
million), and the loss of property sustained 
by Iran. So far, Khomeini has been able to 
justify this holocaust in the name of God. 
This sacrifice, asserts Khomeini, shall not 
go in vain, for God shall reward the be­
lievers with a decisive victory. After all, it is 
written in the holy book of Islam, the 
Qur’an, that whenever the believers fight 
against the infidels (in this case the Iraqis) 
God would send his armies to support the 
believers.
This argument has been convincing to 
the Iranians. If Khomeini or his successor 
succeeded in toppling the regime of Sad­
dam Hussein, the concept of the Divine 
support to the Iranian regime would be 
corroborated among devout Moslems. 
Khomeini and his followers would capitalize 
on this concept and inspire a religious tide in 
the Moslem world.
There are more than 900 million 
Moslems scattered all over the world, with a 
large majority living in underdeveloped 
nations, or as underprivileged minorities 
elsewhere. A victorious Iran would be able 
to inspire the Moslems of the entire Ara­
bian Peninsula, Africa, and the Far East to 
galvanize and start a holy march against the 
enemies of Islam.
Far beyond the boundaries of the Middle 
East and Africa, the echo of an Islamic 
victory would be heard in such remote 
countries as Afghanistan, the Soviet Union 
and China, for example. Moslems in 
Afghanistan constitute a majority of the 
population. The leftist government now 
sitting in Kabul, the capital city, with the 
help of the Soviet Union, has been fighting 
against the Mujahidin fighters since 1979. 
And the Mujahidin still control more than 
half of the territory in Afghanistan.
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The Moslem tide would substantially en­
hance the military prowess of the Afghani 
Mujahidin and probably convince the Sovi­
ets of the futility of the idea of annexing 
Afghanistan.
In fact, the Soviet Union itself would be 
facing substantial difficulties controlling its 
50 million minority (almost 25 percent of 
the Soviet population) of Moslems who, for 
the last six decades, have been impervious 
to Marxist indoctrination. Furthermore, 
both China and India have large Moslem 
minorities and are eagerly awaiting the 
outcome of the Gulf war.2
On the other hand, if Saddam Hussein 
succeeds in surviving this war (which he 
started), the picture of the Middle East 
would be dramatically reversed. The re­
ligious tide would be pushed back and the 
secular-nationalist-socialist ideology would 
prevail. A non-victorious Iran would be a 
perfidious event in the Moslem world and 
Khomeini’s claim of Divine support would 
be rendered fallacious.
Saddam Hussein’s main assets are his 
political experience, his enormous eco­
nomic potential and his youth — when 
compared to the octogenarian Khomeini. 
His tenure in office has been contempo­
raneous with such outstanding Arab lead­
ers as Presidents Gamal Abdul Nasser and 
Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of 
Jordan, and President Hafez al-Assad of 
Syria. Furthermore, he enjoys the advan­
tage of enormous oil riches. All the above- 
mentioned statesmen have presided over 
poor countries and depended on outside 
economic aid.
President Nasser’s radical pan-Arabist 
ideology during the 1950s and ’60s was not 
dissimilar to that of Saddam Hussein. But, 
Nasser’s Egypt was plagued by overpopula­
tion, widespread disease, high illiteracy, 
foreign debt and shortage of funds and 
economic resources. His leadership de­
pended basically on charisma and electrify­
ing rhetoric. Egypt’s social ills played an 
important role in hampering Nasser’s pan- 
Arabist plans.
In contrast, Iraq is a country of medium 
size (about the size of California) with a 
population of 14 million, and it sits on 
enormous oil reserves. There are uncon­
firmed reports that Iraq’s oil reserves 
exceed by far that of Saudi Arabia. Plus, 
with its two great rivers and fertile land, 
Iraq has the capability, if its full agrarian 
potential is exploited, to feed all of its Arab 
neighbors.
Should he survive the war, Saddam
Hussein, with his economic revenues, will 
be able to embark anew on vast develop­
ment projects for Iraq, as well as influence 
the future of the Arab world.
Historical Background
The dispute between Iraq and Iran is an old 
one, the roots of which go back to the 16th 
century when Iraq, then Mesopotamia, was 
a province of the Ottoman Empire.3
In the beginning, the two adjacent old 
Muslim Empires — the Ottoman and the 
Persian — were seemingly on good terms. 
However, when Shali Ismael Safavi of Persia 
adopted Shi’ism as the official sect of his 
government, strife with the Sunni Otto­
mans began and lasted for centuries.
Sultan Selim Yauz, the King of the 
Ottomans, who was fanatically religious, 
dedicated his efforts to the extermination 
from his empire of the “heresy” of Shi’ism. 
The Ottoman and the Persian armies 
collided in 1514 in the valley of Chaldiran, 
whereupon the Persians were soundly de­
feated.
In 1555, the Treaty of Umasiyah was 
signed, which represented the first diplo­
matic attempt to adjust the relations of the 
two Muslim empires and to demarcate the 
borders separating them. Again, a ter­
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ritorial dispute erupted in the 17th century 
and the Persians attacked the Ottomans. 
Sultan Murad IV defeated the Persians and, 
subsequently, the Qasr Sherine Treaty was 
signed in 1639. This treaty included an 
important provision in which the Persians 
acknowledged full sovereignty of the Ot­
tomans over the Shatt al-Arab River. Shatt 
al-Arab is a navigable river, 218 kilometers 
long and 700 meters wide. It is formed from 
the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers, and flows in the southern part of 
Iraq.
In 1727, the Persians attacked again, but 
the war ended with the signing of the Amir 
Ashraf Treaty within the year. Provision 
seven of the treaty specified that the entire 
territory of Arabistan east of Shatt al-Arab 
River was to be placed under the domain of 
the Ottomans.
In 1747, The Nadir Shah Treaty was 
signed and it reemphasized the terms of the 
Qasr Sherine and Amir Ashraf Treaties.
Subsequent to the Nadir Shah Treaty, the 
two empires witnessed a period of relative 
tranquility until 1818 when the Persians 
once again attempted to conquer the Shatt 
al-Arab River. Severe battles erupted and 
the Persians were defeated. The signing of 
the first Arzroom Treaty followed in 1823.
Because of the constant Persian threat to 
the extremely strategic and economically 
important territory of the Shatt al-Arab 
River, the Ottomans decided to solve the 
problem with their neighbors once and for 
all. An enormous military campaign was 
waged by the Ottomans and the Persians 
were pushed back almost to the outskirts of 
their capital city of Tehran. However, Rus­
sia and Great Britain, both with interests in 
the Middle East, intervened and the war 
was stopped. Subsequently, lengthy nego­
tiations followed, under the auspices of the 
two great powers, which culminated in the 
signing of the second Arzroom Treaty in 
1847 by Shah Muhammad and Sultan Abdul 
Majid. In this treaty, the Ottomans retained 
the Shatt al-Arab River within the borders 
of the province of Mesopotamia, but, for the 
first time, surrendered the entire territory 
of Arabistan to the Persians.
A quadripartite international commis­
sion, comprising Russia, Great Britain, 
Persia and the Ottomans, was formed to 
finalize the demarcation of the borders 
between the Persian and the Ottoman 
Empires. However, eruption of war be­
tween Great Britain and Persia in 1851, and 
the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, 
brought those diplomatic efforts to a halt.4
Later, efforts of the quadripartite com­
mission were resumed and culminated in 
the signing of two agreements — the 
Protocol of Tehran in 1911 and the Con­
stantinople Protocol in 1913.
In 1914 the commission finalized the 
demarcation of the borders, incorporating 
the entire bed of the Shatt al-Arab River 
within the borders of Mesopotamia.
Article five of the Constantinople Pro­
tocol specifically laid down that “as soon as 
any part of the frontier has been delineated 
by the commission, that part should be held 
to be finally fixed and should not be open to 
subsequent examination or revision.”5
At last, the ancient, bloody dispute 
between the Ottoman and Persian Empires 
was solved. Or so it seemed.
Origin of the New Conflict
In 1921, after Mesopotamia became the 
Kingdom of Iraq, Faisal Ibn-Hussein was 
enthroned as Iraq’s king. [Persia became 
Iraq in 1935.] From the beginning, Iran’s 
attitude toward the new kingdom was less 
than cordial. For eight years, Iran was 
reluctant to recognize Iraq and it became 
obvious that Reza Shah Pahlavi was reviv­
ing Iran’s old claims to the Shatt al-Arab 
River and other border areas. However, as a 
result of British mediation and Faisal’s 
prudence, relations between Iraq and Iran 
improved and, in August 1929, the two 
countries exchanged diplomatic represen­
tation. In 1932, King Faisal I and Premier 
Nuri al-Sa’id visited Iran to negotiate vari­
ous issues of concern to both countries, but 
the two sides never agreed on a solution to 
the border problem. It remained dormant. 
When King Faisal died in 1933, Iran dis­
avowed all obligations signed with the 
Ottoman Empire and reinitiated its claim to 
the Shatt al-Arab River.
Iraq stood adamant on its right to its 
territory, referring to the 1913 Con­
stantinople Protocol and the delineation of 
the border by the international commission 
in 1914. The view of the Iraqi government 
was that the part of the Ottoman Empire 
which formed the new state of Iraq was 
formally fixed by this delineation.
Tension increased between the two 
countries as news broke that Iran was 
mobilizing and re-arming its military forces 
with weapons purchased from Czechoslo­
vakia. In November 1934, when the tension 
peaked, Iraq took the issue to the League of 
Nations for an appropriate solution to the 
Shatt al-Arab dispute. The debates in the 
League of Nations were lengthy but fruit­
less as both sides remained adamant about 
their claims, citing historical, geographical 
and legal proofs. Iran refused Iraq’s sugges­
tion to refer the issue to the International 
Court of Justice.6
But after Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, 
anxiety prevailed throughout the Middle 
East. President Kemal Ataturk of Turkey 
sent personal letters to the heads of both 
Iraq and Iran, urging them to ’ve the 
boundary issue as soon as possible in order 
to confront the European menace. Turkey 
also suggested that Iraq and Iran withdraw 
their border issue from the League of 
Nations so that it would be free to deal with 
the security of the entire Middle East 
region. The issue was withdrawn and both 
sides began serious negotiations.
After giving some concession in the 
Shatt al-Arab territory, Naji Shawkat, the 
representative of Iraq, succeeded in nego­
tiating the signing of the Treaty of Peaceful 
Settlement of Dispute Between Iraq and 
the Iranian Empire. Shawkat then contin­
ued his contact with Turkey and Afghan­
istan for a quadruple Middle East treaty 
that included Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and 
Afghanistan. On July 4, 1937, the four 
countries signed a nonaggression treaty, 
the Sa’ad Abad Pact.7 Subsequently, for two 
decades, Iran and Iraq nurtured a cordial 
relationship.
In 1955, both Iraq and Iran, along with 
Turkey, Pakistan and Great Britain, joined 
in the Baghdad Pact. The royal regimes in 
Baghdad and Tehran seemed to have agreed 
on a peaceful coexistence.
But in 1958, when the Iraqi monarchy 
was overthrown by a military coup, the 
Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, 
started a border feud all over again. The 
New York Times reported:
“In a press conference held on November 29, 
1958, the Shah of Iran discussed the eternal 
dispute with Iraq. He stated that the 
provisions of the border’s treaty o f1937are 
unbearable and unprecedented. The Shah, 
thus, expressed his desire to cancel the 
treaty.”8
An extensive mass media campaign was 
waged by Iran against Iraq, depicting the 
latter as the usurper of Iranian territory. 
Simultaneously, the Iranian army was mobi­
lized along the southern border of Iraq.
Iraq’s response was rather rational. 
Hashim Jawad, the Iraqi minister of foreign 
affairs, turned to Western powers and world 
public opinion indicating that Iran’s be­
havior was threatening the interests of the
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Middle East as well as world peace.9
As a result of intervention by the United 
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, the 
Shah was restrained; the situation was 
defused, and a military conflagration on the 
Iran-Iraq borders was averted.
The problem, however, was never de­
cisively solved and the dispute lasted 
throughout the military rule in Iraq be­
tween 1958-1968, and several years after 
the Ba’ath Party in 1968 took over the 
reigns of power in Iraq. Finally, after 
strenuous diplomatic efforts, The Treaty of 
Algeria was signed in 1975 by Saddam 
Hussein and Shah Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi.
Noticeably, all disputes between Iraq and 
Iran during the last six decades have been 
solved by means of peaceful diplomacy — 
not war. Yet, a noteworthy point is that 
during all these times, Iraq was negotiating 
from the position of weakness and fear of 
Iran’s preponderance. Iraq’s population and 
territory equal one-third those of Iran. The 
Treaty of Algeria was signed under circum­
stances unfavorable to Iraq. In 1975, the 
Shah, as a result of the influx of American 
weapons, was at the peak of his might and 
Iran was the most awesome power in the 
Middle East. Iraq, on the other hand, was 
fighting an internal war with its Kurdish 
minority in the north, and the government 
in Baghdad was rather shaky.
By 1980, however, the situation was 
reversed. Iran, one year after the fall of the 
Shah, was inflicted with internal turbulence 
and the regime of Imam Khomeini seemed 
vulnerable. For the first time, Iraq felt 
powerful enough for a military confronta­
tion with its larger neighbor. Hence the long 
Gulf war (which lately has invited action by 
the superpowers, particularly the United 
States’ naval escorts for reflagged Kuwaiti 
oil tankers to protect them against attacks 
by Iran. Iraq, in 1984, started what is now 
generally known as the “tanker war”).
Ideological Issues
Khomeini intends to establish an Islamic 
republic headed by the Supreme jurispru­
dence (williat al-faqih). He believes in the 
establishment of an Islamic world governed 
by the laws of God. The imperfection of the 
existing world, Khomeini believes, stems 
from two sources.10
First, he believes that the Western con­
cept of the “nation-state” is philosophically 
defective because it is the creation of man’s 
“inferior mind.”
Second, he believes that the existing
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international system is essentially iniq­
uitous partly because the superpowers 
monopolize world power to themselves at 
the expense of the masses.
From this stipulation, Khomeini divides 
the world into two camps: The camp of the 
“oppressors” (Mustakbirin), which is led by 
both the United States and Soviet Union— 
the “Greatest Satan” and the “Godless 
Communist,” respectively — and the camp 
of the “oppressed” (Mustaz’-a-fin), consist­
ing mainly, but not exclusively, of the people 
of the Islamic and other Third World 
countries.
By creating an Islamic world whose 
political and social values are derived from 
the perfect laws set forth by God in His holy 
book, the Qur’an, Khomeini believes man 
will be able to establish a society which is as 
close as possible to perfection.
The phrase “exporting Islamic Revolu­
tion” is not simply a revolutionary cry; it is a 
paramount pillar of the foreign policy of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. The doctrine of 
the export of Islamic revolution aims simul­
taneously at three interconnected goals in 
Iran’s foreign policy (1) paving the way 
toward the ultimate goal of the establish­
ment of an Islamic world ruled by the 
Shari’ah, (2) promoting populist, inde­
pendent Islamic governments in other 
states, and (3) protecting the first and only 
such state and government in Iran.11
Facing Iran’s religious system is Iraq, 
under the rule of Saddam Hussein, the 
secretary of the Ba’ath revolutionary Arab 
nationalist party. The Ba’ath Party as­
sumed leadership when the Arab world 
witnessed an important historical develop­
ment — the radicalization of Arab na­
tionalism in the 1950s. This can be traced to 
the Palestine war in 1948 and the subse­
quent creation of the state of Israel. So 
traumatic to the Arabs was the loss of 
Palestine that it precipitated transforma­
tion of Arab nationalism, shifting the em­
phasis from the attitude of romantic 
glorification of the past to the failure of the 
present. The Arab world was in need of a 
new nationalist creed and leadership to 
cope with the modern world and the Ba’ath 
(meaning resurrection) Party arose to as­
sume that responsibility.12
While Iraq and Iran are stubbornly en­
gaged in a costly ideological war of mutual 
annihilation, there are other forces that are 
preventing all efforts of a settlement. The 
Gulf war is providing several arms-produc- 
ing countries with lucrative business. And 
the United States remains suspicious of
both Khomeini and Saddam Hussein. Both 
leaders, the U.S. believes, are adamantly 
against Israel and the influence of the 
Western powers in the Middle East.
From the onset of his regime, Khomeini 
flagrantly vilified the “zionist entity” and 
also the United States.
President Saddam Hussein, also has 
been invariably pan-Arabist, anti-Israel and 
anti-West. He vehemently rejected the 
“Camp David Accord” and urged all “pro­
gressive” elements to oppose it and pursue 
their struggle against the “zionist entity.”
Although the Iraqi regime has lately 
softened its staunch anti-Israel stance and 
has promised not to hamper peace efforts 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the 
United States still has its suspicion that 
Iraq’s change of attitude is dictated by the 
ephemeral contingency of the Gulf war.
As for Khomeini, it is not in his interest to 
end the war so long as Saddam Hussein is 
still in power. Any settlement, short of 
toppling Saddam Hussein, would be tanta­
mount to a total ideological defeat for 
Khomeini, and would damage his credibility.
Khomeini’s strongest asset lies in his 
religious status among Moslems. Most 
Iranians, and non-Iranian Moslem zealots, 
are firmly convinced that Imam Khomeini 
has the Almighty God on his side. One of the 
evidences of this support forged by the 
followers of Khomeini is the manner in 
which the Shah, the most powerful political 
figure in the Middle East, was overthrown 
in 1979. If it was not for God’s will, exclaim 
believers, then how could Khomeini, the 
exiled, frail octogenarian clergyman, topple 
the Shah, commander of the most formida­
ble military machine in the Middle East? 
Besides his local awesome power, the Shah 
had the United States, the most powerful 
country on this planet, on his side. Yet, 
despite all these factors, Khomeini, de­
pending entirely on his religious influence 
among the people of Iran, was able to 
overthrow him.
As far as the war with Iraq is concerned, 
the Iranian leadership sees it as a holy war 
(Jihad) against the socialist “infidel re­
gime” of Iraq. Khomeini, counting on 
Divine help, made the pledge that he would 
not stop the war before removing Saddam 
Hussein and the Ba’athist regime from 
Baghdad.13 Thus, if, for any reason, Kho­
meini agrees to stop the war without 
fulfilling his pledge, then his religious foun­
dation would be utterly shattered. His 
followers would come to the conclusion that 
either Khomeini does not possess the
Divine support he claims, or, the more 
terrifying explanation: all religious founda­
tions are nothing but a mammoth hoax.
Contrary to Khomeini’s dilemma, the 
position of Saddam Hussein is much more 
relaxed. He has shrewdly made overtures 
toward a peaceful settlement, but was 
rejected several times by Iran. Thus, Sad­
dam Hussein may have gained the sympa­
thy of the international community. He is 
aware that if his peace efforts bear fruit, he 
would be able to boast that he has been able 
to confront Iran’s preponderance for several 
years and keep Iraq’s integrity intact.
Meanwhile, the destructive war is sap­
ping the human and economic sources of 
both countries, and despite the efforts of 
several Islamic countries (and a U.N. cease­
fire resolution) it seems that there is no 
hope for a peaceful settlement for the 
foreseeable future unless either Ayatullah 
Khomeini or Saddam Hussein no longer 
remain on the scene.
Conclusion
The Gulf war is basically a conflict between 
religious and secular ideologies, both of 
which are attempting to prevail in the 
Middle East. The origin of both ideologies 
can be traced to the same sources — 
frustration with backwardness and anti­
imperialist feelings.
Before the Islamic revolution, [the vast 
majority of] the Iranian people were under 
the yoke of the throne of Shah Muhammad 
Reza Pahlavi. They were brutalized by a 
police state, impoverished and controlled 
by Western interests. The religious outcry 
by Khomeini for freedom, dignity and 
economic equity under an Islamic regime 
was met by thunderous approval of the 
Iranian masses. And the regime, eight 
years after the revolution, is showing no 
signs of weakness. The Iranians hope that, 
when the war is over, Iran can still utilize its 
vast resources and accomplish dramatic 
development and that their regime would 
become a model for the rest of the Moslem 
world.
Ba’athism, on the other hand, under the 
leadership of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, is an 
ideology stipulating that religion has no role 
in the function of government. The Ba’ath 
Party intends to mobilize the 125 million 
Arabs in the region and steer them to build a 
“United Arab Socialist country” in order to 
cure the Arab world from its backwardness 
and other social ills.
Obviously, both ideologies aspire to serve 
their peoples and provide for their welfare,
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but they differ in their methods of imple­
menting their plans.
All these dreams of good future and 
prosperity will go unfulfilled unless Iran and 
Iraq agree to end their destructive war and 
steer their energies toward the welfare of 
their peoples. Should Iran and Iraq fail to 
come to a peaceful agreement, their irre­
placeable resources will be depleted and 
their peoples will suffer for a long time. □
Mamoon Amin Zaki, Ph.D., is an associate pro­
fessor of political science at LeMoyne-Owens Col­
lege, Memphis, Tenn.
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